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De minimis non curat lex—the idea that the law does not concern itself with
trifles—is originally a private law maxim whose applicability in criminal law is
uncertain. The author argues that de minimis should not exist as a criminal defence.
This article distinguishes the use of de minimis as an (accepted) interpretative
principle in criminal law from its application as a defence. In doing so, the author
critiques the potential rationales for de minimis offered by Arbour J in Canadian
Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v Canada (Attorney General).
Instead, the author draws a parallel between de minimis and constitutional
exemptions, arguing that they are functionally identical. As the Supreme Court
of Canada has rejected constitutional exemptions as a remedy, it should also reject
de minimis as a defence. The author also notes that judges are responsible for
adjudicating innocence and guilt, not deciding whether the criminal justice system
should be invoked—judges should not have the power to override prosecutorial
discretion by invoking de minimis.
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Introduction
Don Stuart is the Dean of Canadian criminal law academics.
How do you talk about the contributions of the man who literally wrote the
book on substantive criminal law (Learning Canadian Criminal Law, now in its
14th edition), on criminal procedure (Learning Canadian Criminal Procedure,
now in its 12th edition) and on evidence (Evidence: Principles and Problems, now
in its 12th edition)? Not to forget as well Canadian Criminal Law: A Treatise
(now in its 7th edition) and Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law (also in
its 7th edition). There can be very few criminal law scholars in Canada today
who did not—like me—learn at least one of those subjects from a text written
by Don.
And it is not just academics who have benefited from Don’s work. As the
Editor-in-Chief, for decades, of the Criminal Reports and of the National
Judicial Institute’s Criminal Law Essentials e-Letter, Don has written a great
deal that has been readily available to practitioners and the judiciary, and it has
been frequently made use of.
Where Don has written so much, about so much, it becomes difficult
to decide what topic to focus on in a paper meant to honour him. In an
attempt to narrow down the range of possibilities, I decided to look only at
Supreme Court of Canada decisions, to see when they had cited him. That was
instructive but not helpful: it turns out that the list of areas where the Supreme
Court of Canada has relied on Don’s work includes subjective fault, objective
fault, general versus specific intent, motive, recklessness, wilful blindness,
legal duties, predicate offences, consent, causation, the simultaneity principle,
constructive murder, dangerous driving, sexual assault, criminal negligence,
child luring, party liability, attempts, conspiracy, corporate criminal liability,
the presumption of innocence, burden of proof, the role of common law,
the principle of legality, vagueness, the air of reality test, self-defence, duress,
provocation, officially induced error, entrapment, intoxication, automatism,
mental disorder, the right to silence, the doctrine of recent possession, hearsay,
Vetrovec warnings, cross-examination on prior testimony, exclusion of evidence,
jurisdiction over remedies under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,1
1.  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982,
c 11.
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the requirement to give reasons, corporal punishment, non-retrospectivity of
punishment, proportionality in sentencing, double jeopardy, police powers,
interrogations, arrest powers, bail, search incident to arrest, searches of lawyers’
offices, and searches in the school setting. No one else comes even remotely close
to having been cited by the Court so often in criminal law matters.
Another thing to know about Don—and a thing which anyone who has
met him will know—is that he is passionate about ideas. If he thinks something
is right, he will defend the notion that it is right, and if he thinks it is wrong,
he will staunchly and unambiguously oppose it: the expression “make no bones
about it” might have been coined with Don in mind. I fondly recall attending
the ceremony where Don was presented with the 2012 G. Arthur Martin
Criminal Justice Medal by the Criminal Lawyers’ Association, and listening
to his acceptance speech in which he berated the lawyers assembled to honour
him (I am sure he did not think of it as berating) for not reading enough work
by academics. Personally, I find this forthrightness on his part valuable and
refreshing: when Don praises someone (and as they say, “praise from Caesar is
praise indeed”), you can be certain it is motivated by absolutely nothing but
his high opinion.
However, despite his passion, Don is entirely devoid of any personal
animosity: he never makes the mistake of confusing the person with the idea,
and his disagreement with an opinion about a criminal law matter has no
relation to his view of the person holding that opinion. Indeed, more than that,
Don is as fair-minded as one could ask: having co-authored a number of things
with him, I can say that he is always concerned to see to it that the views of
those who hold a differing view from him are given space. Many, indeed once
again probably most, Canadian criminal law scholars have been helped by Don
somewhere along the way.
Another key feature of Don’s approach to the law is to be constructive.
He has noted more than once that it is easy for us as academics to sit back
and point out when things were done wrong, but it is much harder to be the
person who has to try to do things right. Don’s view is that academics should
contribute to the development of the law by putting forward positive proposals,
not just criticize what others have done. It was that attitude which led him
to organize a conference of a very large number of academics from across the
country, leading to the publication of Towards a Clear and Just Criminal Law, a
collection of essays putting forward specific proposals about how to reform and
improve every aspect of the criminal justice system.2

2.  Don Stuart, RJ Delisle & Allan Manson, eds, Towards a Clear and Just Criminal Law: A
Criminal Reports Forum (Toronto: Carswell, 1999).
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Which leads, finally, to my choice of topic for this paper. Don and I agree
about many things, but not all, and it seemed appropriate here to choose one
of those topics about which we disagree. Further, it needed to be a topic where
it was useful to make specific proposals with regard to how the law should
behave, not merely criticize the status quo. Accordingly, this paper will address
the maxim “de minimis non curat lex”: the law does not concern itself with
trifles. Don’s view is that de minimis should be available as a defence in criminal
proceedings, although he acknowledges that “general authority for the maxim
in criminal law is, at best, sketchy”.3 My view is that no such defence ought
to exist in Canadian criminal law, and so this paper is intended to show why
Don is mistaken. The proper approach for the law—when this point does get
settled—is to reject such a defence.

I. De Minimis: The Issue Explained
The de minimis defence is what I like to think of as a “ghost” defence at the
moment: it is occasionally sighted (and cited) but has not been proven to exist.
Some trial courts have rejected the defence as not applicable in the criminal
justice system, while others have applied it.4 Sometimes courts have considered
whether it applies to, or is excluded from application to, particular offences.5
A typical approach of courts of appeal has been to find that if the defence did
exist it was not made out on the facts of the case, and therefore that it was
not necessary to decide whether the defence actually existed.6 The Supreme
Court of Canada has not authoritatively pronounced on the defence, though
3.  Don Stuart, Canadian Criminal Law: A Treatise, 7th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2014) at 656,
660. See also Hamish Stewart, “Parents, Children, and the Law of Assault” (2009) 32:1 Dal
LJ 1 (noting that “it is not clear whether Canadian criminal law recognizes the defence of de
minimis at all” at 17).
4.  For cases that rejected the defence as not applicable in the criminal justice system, see R v Li
(1984), 16 CCC (3d) 382, [1984] OJ No 569 (QL) (Ont H Ct J); R v Appleby (1990), 78 CR
(3d) 282, [1990] OJ No 1329 (QL) (Ont Prov Ct). For cases that determined that the defence
could be available, see R v Lepage (1989), 79 Sask R 246, 74 CR (3d) 368 (QB); R v Matsuba
(GA) (1993), 137 AR 34, [1993] AJ No 93 (QL) (Prov Ct); R v Elek, [1994] YJ No 31 (QL)
(Y Terr Ct); R v Hnatiuk, 2000 ABQB 314; R v Chapman, 2008 ONCJ 552; R v Beets, 2017
YKTC 17; Peel (Region, Department of Public Health) v Le Royal Resto and Lounge Inc, 2017
ONCJ 767; R v Arsenault, 2018 ONCJ 224.
5.  See R v Carson (2004), 185 OAC 298, 185 CCC (3d) 541 (CA); R c Gosselin, 2012 QCCA
1874. Both cases held that de minimis cannot apply to charges of domestic assault.
6.  See R v Kubassek (2004), 189 OAC 339, 25 CR (6th) 340 (CA); R v Chessa, 1983
CarswellBC 1792 (WL Can), [1983] BCJ No 1201 (QL) (BCCA); R v Babiak (1974), 21
CCC (2d) 464, 1974 CarswellMan 107 (WL Can) (Man CA).
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occasionally in obiter it has been referred to without being explicitly rejected,
or even as though it might exist.7 Whether de minimis actually exists as a rule
within the criminal justice system, therefore, is unsettled.
We should begin by setting out exactly what is at issue here. The rule
“de minimis non curat lex” is almost exclusively referred to in its Latin form
(presumably because, as is well-known, the use of Latin “causes little difficulty
for lawyers and judges”8), and translates into English as “the law does not
concern itself with trifles”. In its origin it is a private law rule, meant to be of
significance primarily to contract law. It is the notion that, for example, if a
contracted shipment of thousands of pounds of some item is short by a few
ounces, this will not be seen as a breach of the contract: in essence, some failures
to live up to an agreement are so trivial as not to be worth worrying about. The
most apt private law example imaginable concerning a rule about “trifles” is Joe
Lowe Food Products Co v JA & P Holland Ltd, which applied the rule in a case
concerning some lumps in a shipment of dessert powder.9
I do not propose to discuss whether the rule fits well in a private law
context.10 However, I do argue that it is not a rule which should be transferred
to the criminal law sphere: specifically, de minimis ought not to be available as
a defence to a criminal charge.
It is important from the start to draw a distinction here. The purported
“defence” of de minimis would allow a judge to make an exception to what
would otherwise be criminal liability. That is, just as a person might be found
to have committed assault but be acquitted based on self-defence, creating a
defence of de minimis would allow a judge to say that the accused has committed
an offence but should be acquitted nonetheless. A judge could conclude that
the accused had committed an assault but such a minor one that the defence
should succeed,11 or had stolen something but of such small value that she
should not be convicted,12 or possessed contraband but in such small quantity
7.  In Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v Canada (Attorney General), the
majority rejected the dissent’s reliance on de minimis on the basis that “it is equally or more
vague and difficult in application than the reasonableness defence offered by s. 43”. See 2004
SCC 4 at para 44 [Canadian Foundation]. See also R v Cuerrier, [1998] 2 SCR 371 at para 21,
162 DLR (4th) 513, L’Heureux-Dubé J (writing for herself only, suggesting that in some cases
of deception used to gain consent to what would otherwise be assault, the de minimis principle
“might apply” to prevent a finding of guilt).
8.  R v Nette, 2001 SCC 78 at para 71.
9.  [1954] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 71, [1954] WLUK 34 (QB).
10.  Primarily because I would be completely unequipped to do so.
11.  Which succeeded in R v Johnson (DM). See (2000), 198 Sask R 87, 2000 CarswellSask
634 (WL Can) (Prov Ct).
12.  Which failed in R v Li. See supra note 4.
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that he should be acquitted.13 As Don has put it, a defence of de minimis would
be a “dispensing power”.14
Importantly, that is not the only potential use of the de minimis concept.
There is a significant difference between using de minimis as a defence and simply
using it as an interpretive aid. Don has argued, for example, in his temperately
titled “The Charter Is a Vital Living Tree Not a Weed to Be Stunted: Justice
Moldaver Has Overstated” that:
The most surprising aspect of the judgment [R v Boulanger] is
the Court’s determination that the accused should have been
acquitted because the conduct lacked the level of seriousness
required for the offence . . . The Boulanger decision is now
authority for applying this principle of restraint to the actus
reus component. It appears to be saying judges can acquit if
they decide that the conduct was trivial. This has the look
of the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex not previously
endorsed by the Supreme Court. The Chief Justice is
certainly and commendably on a roll in leading the Court to
interpreting criminal offences with restraint.15
This passage, it seems to me, does not sufficiently acknowledge the difference
between using de minimis as an interpretive aid and using it as a defence. To say
that only conduct of a certain level of seriousness will ever be captured by the
wording of an offence is quite different from saying “judges can acquit if they
decide that the conduct this time was criminal but trivial”.
The Supreme Court of Canada has accepted that the de minimis rule can be
a guide to interpretation, indicating the proper understanding of a provision
which is otherwise ambiguous. In Ontario v Canadian Pacific Ltd, for example,
the Court was faced with a section 7 challenge to Ontario’s Environmental
Protection Act, based on the argument that the definition of “contaminant”,
which depended on the phrase “impair the quality of the natural environment
for any use that can be made of it”, was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.16
The Court rejected the challenge, finding that the provision in question had
a clear enough meaning. In reaching that conclusion, they relied upon the

13.  Which failed in R v Quigley. See (1954), 20 CR 152 at 156, 111 CCC 81 (Alta SC (AD))
(where the accused was found guilty of possession of a narcotic for what amounted to dust).
14.  Don Stuart, “Bedford: Striking Down Prostitution Laws and Revising Section 7 Standards
to Focus on Arbitrariness” (2014) 7 CR (7th) 52 at 53.
15.  (2006) 40 CR (6th) 280 at 284 [footnotes omitted].
16.  [1995] 2 SCR 1031 at paras 61, 65, 125 DLR (4th) 385.
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principle that a law should not be interpreted in a way that would make it
absurd, as well as the principle de minimis non curat lex, to determine the proper
interpretation of the provision:
[Subsection] 13(1)(a) does not attach penal consequences to
trivial or minimal impairments of the natural environment,
nor to the impairment of a use of the natural environment
which is merely conceivable or imaginable. A degree of
significance, consistent with the objective of environmental
protection, must be found in relation to both the impairment,
and the use which is impaired.17
The Charter claim was therefore rejected.
In that case, however, the de minimis rule was not used as a defence. The
Court did not find that the accused had contaminated the environment but
that, as it was only a trivial contamination, they would ignore the violation
of the statute. Rather, they interpreted the statute, because of the de minimis
principle (among other things), to mean that trivial contaminations were not
in this case or any case captured by the statute.
That is quite different from using de minimis as a defence. In R v Croft,18
for example, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal was faced with an accused who
was charged with having undersized lobsters. Among the defences he pleaded
was de minimis: that as the lobsters were not very much under the correct size,
the court should overlook the offence and acquit him. The court held that the
de minimis defence was not available in the context of a strict liability offence
“where compliance is measured in millimetres”.19 If the accused had violated
the terms of the statute, then he was guilty: the offence could not be ignored
because it was close to compliance.
This distinction was captured well by Dawson J of the Ontario Superior
Court of Justice in R v Khan:
While it remains an unsettled question as to whether the de
minimis principle, embodied in the legal maxim “de minimis
non curat lex” (the law does not concern itself with trifles), is
available as a common law defence preserved by s. 8(3) of the
Criminal Code, there is considerable authority for reliance on
the de minimis principle as an aid to statutory interpretation

17.  Ibid at para 65.
18.  2003 NSCA 109.
19.  Ibid at para 15.
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when defining the scope or reach of the actus reus of a criminal
offence.20
One consequence of drawing that distinction clearly is the one I have already
pointed to: support for the concept of applying de minimis in the abstract is not
the same as support for a free-standing de minimis defence to a criminal charge.
But there is a deeper significance to the distinction as well.
The central point of a de minimis defence would be to say “although this
behaviour is captured within the scope and language of this prohibition, it is
so trivial that it ought not to attract a criminal sanction”. More simply, the
rationale can be thought of as saying that the accused should have a defence
because the conduct in question was not what the offence provision was aiming
at. The case for such a defence would be more compelling the more that the
scope and language of a criminal prohibition is relatively unconstrained: if
wording on its face captures far more behaviour than we really think of as
criminal, then the temptation to say “this was just de minimis” becomes greater.
But in the case of such an overbroad prohibition, our first instinct ought
not to be to rely on de minimis: it ought to be to rely on overbreadth! That is,
if the offence is really so broad as to capture behaviour it ought not to, then it
might well violate section 7 of the Charter and be unconstitutional.
However, it is not necessary to go so far as to mount a constitutional
challenge. The principle of restraint is applicable in the interpretation of
criminal prohibitions in many ways, and should be applied to keep too broad
an approach in check. Specifically, one of the ways that the principle of restraint
can manifest itself is precisely through the use of de minimis as an interpretive
aid. We ought not to be saying, “usually the offence captures this type of
behaviour but, exceptionally, not this time”: rather we should say, “this offence
must be interpreted never to capture trivial behaviour”.
Janine Benedet (one of those people Don disagrees with but respects
nonetheless) has pointed to essentially this point, in the context of the potential
relevance of de minimis to sexual assault. The Supreme Court of Canada has not
explicitly ruled out the use of de minimis with regard to a sexual assault charge,
in part (as we shall see further below) because it has never authoritatively
pronounced one way or the other on de minimis in general. However, in R v
JA, McLachlin CJC commented that: “Without suggesting that the de minimis
principle has no place in the law of sexual assault, it should be noted that
even mild non-consensual touching of a sexual nature can have profound
implications for the complainant.”21

20.  2014 ONSC 6541 at para 24.
21.  2011 SCC 28 at para 63.
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I suggest we can go further than that. Of course, I am arguing against de
minimis as a defence to any charge, but the sexual assault provision is particularly
instructive. Janine points out: “Since the sexual nature of the touching is
measured objectively, with the intention or purpose of the accused only one
factor to be considered, is it possible that there could be touching that violates
the sexual integrity of the victim that should not attract the attention of the
criminal law?”22
This seems to me to be an important point. In essence “violating the sexual
integrity of the victim” and “being trivial” ought to be mutually exclusive
categories. We all have some mental image of what might constitute a “minor
sexual assault”: an example I often use in class is an unwanted kiss on the cheek
under the mistletoe at a Christmas party. But properly understood, surely there
can be no such thing as a “trivial sexual assault”. If it is genuinely trivial it has
not violated the complainant’s sexual integrity and is not a sexual assault at all,
and if it has violated her sexual integrity it is hard to see on what basis that could
be considered trivial.
Now of course not every offence in the Code has been interpreted with
such care to try to find the right balance as sexual assault, and it might be that
not every offence has language which lends itself easily to that task. Further,
in some cases provisions have already been interpreted in ways that might be
inconsistent with this goal: for example, in assault “‘[f ]orce’ can include any
touching, no matter the degree of strength or power applied”.23 But perhaps
instances like that should be seen as a lost opportunity to be revisited, rather
than an obstacle. The open-endedly broad interpretation of assault creates
more than one difficulty,24 and one of them is the very temptation to create
a de minimis defence in order to solve the problem that interpretation caused.
Wouldn’t an approach that avoided problems, rather than creating them and
then solving them, be a better use of judicial time and resources?
That is why I say recognizing the distinction between de minimis
as a defence and as an interpretive aid is important. Nothing prevents
courts from trying to use the de minimis principle as an interpretive aid,
with regard to any offence, in order to “calibrate” it to capture only the
intended behaviour: indeed, they ought to do so. As the Supreme Court
of Canada has held, there is “a principle of statutory construction which
decrees that Parliament does not intend through the criminal law to trap

22.  Janine Benedet, Case Comment on R v Smale, (2016) 27 CR (7th) 84 at 84.
23.  Cuerrier, supra note 7 at para 10.
24.  See e.g. R v Barton, 2017 ABCA 216. “‘Force’ is an easily misunderstood term. As a legal
term of art under s 265, it includes touching. However, while lawyers and judges appreciate the
nuances in this term, the word ‘force’ confounds juries. And understandably so” (ibid at 202).
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trivial, non-criminal conduct”.25 And once that is done, once the wording of
the offence is interpreted in a way limited only to the behaviour genuinely
intended to be proscribed, it becomes very difficult to say “this particular piece
of behaviour falls within the intended scope of the provision, but nonetheless is
too trivial to be worth worrying about”.
As a result, acknowledging the possibility of the principle’s use as an
interpretive aid does not merely reduce the need to use de minimis as a defence:
it makes the range of cases where the defence could plausibly be pleaded
diminishingly small.

II. The Case for De Minimis (Rebutted)
If de minimis does exist, it is of course as a common law defence “preserved”
by subsection 8(3). I put “preserved” in scare quotes because there is a
distinction about the common law which is rarely drawn but ought to be
noted more often; the difference between what I like to describe as “historical”
common law and “new” common law. Some common law can definitely be
thought of as being preserved, and in a sense discovered. When the Supreme
Court of Canada decided in R v Ruzic, for example, that the common law
defence of duress required only a strict temporal connection, rather than that
the threatener be physically present and making the threat at the time, it did
so by looking at the prior case law from Canada, England, Australia, and the
United States to determine what was already being done.26 In contrast, when
the Court decided in Lévis (City) v Tétreault; Lévis (City) v 2629–4470 Québec
Inc that the common law defence of officially induced error existed, it was
a conscious rejection of the “ignorance of the law is no excuse” rule which
otherwise prevailed.27 That is, one can think of Ruzic as discovering what the
law already was, and beginning to apply again rules which had been overwritten
by statute: Lévis, on the other hand, was not discovering what the law was, but
deciding what the law should be.28
It is a difference worth noting, because in the case of a historical common
law defence, broadly speaking the question is whether it does exist, while in the
case of a new common law defence the question is whether it should exist. If de
minimis is to apply, it will be a new defence, which means the arguments for

25.  R v Hinchey, [1996] 3 SCR 1128 at para 36, 142 DLR (4th) 50.
26.  2001 SCC 24.
27.  2006 SCC 12 at para 21.
28.  And, it is worth noting, the policy justification for that new defence came from Don’s
Canadian Criminal Law: A Treatise, by way of Lamer CJC’s judgment in R v Jorgensen. See R v
Jorgensen, [1995] 4 SCR 55 at paras 5–7, 129 DLR (4th) 510.
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it should focus on whether it should be created. However, as a generalization,
and with respect, most judicial consideration which has favoured the existence
of the defence has focused more on whether it does exist, and has said relatively
little about whether it should. There are some cases, however, which have
looked at why the defence should exist, not merely whether it does.
A majority of the Supreme Court of Canada referred to the possibility of a
de minimis defence but specifically declined to decide the point in R v Hinchey
(where, of course, they cited Don on the point).29 In Hinchey the Court was
faced with interpreting subsection 121(c) of the Criminal Code, which very
broadly prohibits government employees from receiving a “benefit of any kind”
from people who have dealings with government.30 The majority and minority
agreed that some way of limiting the scope of this provision needed to be found,
since on its face it would criminalize, for example, accepting a cup of coffee. The
majority and minority disagreed over exactly how to limit the subsection. For
our purposes here, it is only important to know that the minority’s approach
would have limited the subsection much more significantly than the majority’s
did: the majority’s approach, though not unlimited, still left the subsection
with quite a broad scope. Writing for the majority, L’Heureux‑Dubé J held
that this approach was sufficient to avoid criminalizing trivial and unintended
violations of the statute. She went on to add, however, that:
Nevertheless, assuming that situations could still arise which
do not warrant a criminal sanction, there might be another
method to avoid entering a conviction: the principle of de
minimis non curat lex, that “the law does not concern itself
with trifles”. This type of solution to cases where an accused
has “technically” violated a Code section has been proposed
by the Canadian Bar Association, in Principles of Criminal
Liability: Proposals for a New General Part of the Criminal Code
of Canada (1992), and others: see Professor Stuart, Canadian
Criminal Law: A Treatise (3rd ed. 1995) at pp. 542‑46. I am
aware, however, that this principle’s potential application as
a defence to criminal culpability has not yet been decided
by this Court, and would appear to be the subject of some
debate in the courts below. Since a resolution of this issue
is not strictly necessary to decide this case, I would prefer to
leave this issue for another day.31
29.  Supra note 25 at para 69.
30.  RSC 1985, c C-46, s 121(c).
31.  R v Hinchey, supra note 25 at para 69. Commenting on this, Don asked: “Why then did
she expressly back off adopting the controversial but sensible de minimis non curat lex principle?
This was the logical extension of the opinion and would have established a useful doctrine.”

S. Coughlan

272

Subsequently in Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v
Canada (Attorney General), Arbour J, in dissent, argued that even if section 43
of the Criminal Code, permitting physical discipline by parents of children, were
struck down, parents could still rely on the de minimis defence “for their trivial
use of force to restrain children when appropriate”.32 Justice Arbour’s discussion
of de minimis in that case, though relatively brief, is the most extensive to date
in a Supreme Court of Canada decision. She says:
Generally, the justifications for a de minimis excuse
are that: (1) it reserves the application of the criminal law
to serious misconduct; (2) it protects an accused from the
stigma of a criminal conviction and from the imposition of
severe penalties for relatively trivial conduct; and (3) it saves
courts from being swamped by an enormous number of
trivial cases.33
None of these reasons should be seen as persuasive.
No one could disagree that the application of the criminal law ought to be
reserved to serious misconduct, but that does not lead to the conclusion that
a de minimis defence should exist. The whole point of moving our criminal
law from a common law system to one based on statute is to respect the rule
of law: specifically, to decide the criminal law based on rules, not on the caseby-case feelings of the individual judge in the individual case. I think that is an
unexceptional claim.
There is at some level a broad societal sense of what should or should not
be criminal, and the provisions in the Criminal Code are meant to “map on” to
that intuitive sense and capture it accurately. Of course, there will certainly be
times when a judge’s individual sense of what should or should not be criminal
and what the application of the provisions in the Code say is criminal will
reach a different result. That is the reason that we have the expression “hard
cases make bad law”: the hard cases are those ones where there is a disconnect
between our intuitive sense of fairness and the dictates of the statute.34 But the
point of the rule of law—of the system we have long opted for and have now
enshrined in the Charter—is that the statute has to prevail over the individual
judge’s personal sense of right and wrong.
See Don Stuart, “Corruption in Hinchey: Scrambling Mens Rea Principles” (1997) 3 CR (5th)
238 at 246.
32.  Supra note 7 at para 132.
33.  Ibid at para 204.
34.  For further discussion of this point, see Steve Coughlan, “Canada Needs a Criminal Code”
in Julie Desrosiers, Margarida Garcia & Marie-Eve Sylvestre, eds, Criminal Law Reform in
Canada: Challenges and Possibilities (Montreal: Yvon Blais, 2017) 37 at 42–43.
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Now, of course “reserving the application of the criminal law to serious
misconduct” is a very good reason to use de minimis as an interpretive principle,
and to read provisions in the Criminal Code so that they always, in every case,
are limited to serious enough conduct as to be the appropriate concern of the
criminal law. As Arbour J also observed in Canadian Foundation: “In part,
the theory is based on a notion that the evil to be prevented by the offence
section has not actually occurred. This is consistent with the dual fundamental
principle of criminal justice that there is no culpability for harmless and
blameless conduct.”35
But to interpret a section to always be limited to the evil to be prevented is
very different from giving individual judges a dispensing power to choose not
to apply the law. As noted in the previous section, if provisions are interpreted
with restraint in the first place, the need for a de minimis defence is greatly
reduced. And if we are genuinely in the realm where the “fundamental principle
of criminal justice that there is no culpability for harmless and blameless
conduct” is in issue,36 then a Charter remedy of either striking down or reading
in to the provision will be available. That rationale and the approach it leads
to, as noted in the previous section, not only does not require the use of a
dispensing power of de minimis as a defence, it actually reduces the potential
number of cases where such a defence could plausibly arise.
That said, of course it is unlikely—perhaps impossible—that every provision
will be capable of interpretation in a way to remove all of the “hard cases”. But
in those very few cases, one should take note of what the majority also said in
Hinchey: “If Parliament chooses to criminalize conduct which, notwithstanding
Charter scrutiny, appears to be outside of what a judge considers ‘criminal’, there
must be a sense of deference to the legislated authority which has specifically
written in these elements.”37
Constitutionally this is correct. Courts have the ability and the duty to make
the Criminal Code Charter compliant, and beyond that to interpret offences in
order not to capture trivial behaviour. But if all of that work has been done and
there is still a policy disagreement between the judge and Parliament about the
individual case, courts should defer to legislators.38
Justice Arbour’s second rationale is that de minimis “protects an accused from
the stigma of a criminal conviction and from the imposition of severe penalties

35.  Supra note 7 at para 204.
36.  Ibid.
37.  Supra note 25 at para 36.
38.  There is an analogy here to minimum sentences, where the Supreme Court of Canada has
reached the conclusion that judges must either find that a statutory provision is unconstitutional
and strike it down for all cases, or respect it: see the discussion of constitutional exemptions at
280–83, below.
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for relatively trivial conduct”.39 To a large extent this concern seems only to be
the first concern again, but looked at from the perspective of the accused: in the
abstract, the system should not capture trivial conduct, and the accused should
not be prosecuted for trivial conduct. To that extent the discussion above
addresses the second point as well. However, there is potentially a distinction
to be drawn between the interests of the accused in not being convicted and
the interests of the system itself. This concern might also be understood to
be, as Duncan J put it in R v Juneja, “to preserve dignity and respect for the
administration of justice by not trivializing the important work of the courts”.40
Again, one could hardly say that this is not an appropriate concern: preserving
respect for the administration of justice is, at bottom, the foundation for section
24 Charter remedies such as exclusion of evidence or stays of proceedings, for
example. But also, again, that the concern is a legitimate one does not lead to
the conclusion that a defence of de minimis should exist.
Fundamentally, to say that the concern is that the work of the court has been
trivialized is to say that this particular case ought not to have been brought before
it: to say that is simply to disagree with the Crown’s exercise of prosecutorial
discretion in the individual case. However, it is well-established that a judge
is not entitled to simply disagree with a Crown’s exercise of prosecutorial
discretion, or at least not short of abuse of process—and if an abuse of process
claim could be made out, a de minimis defence would be unnecessary.
There can, in some cases, be confusion over exactly what sorts of decisions
by a prosecutor fall within core prosecutorial discretion, but there is no
ambiguity at all that the decision to initiate or continue a prosecution falls
within it.41 Once it is recognized that the proposed de minimis defence is merely
disagreement with the decision to bring a prosecution—not analogous to that,
not similar to that, but that—it should be obvious that judges cannot be given
entry by the back door to the power they have been deliberately denied at
the front door. The Supreme Court of Canada explained in R v Anderson the
rationale for this rule:
The many decisions that Crown prosecutors are called
upon to make in the exercise of their prosecutorial discretion
must not be subjected to routine second-guessing by the
courts. The courts have long recognized that decisions
involving prosecutorial discretion are unlike other decisions
made by the executive . . .. Judicial non-interference with
prosecutorial discretion has been referred to as a “matter of
principle based on the doctrine of separation of powers as well
39.  Canadian Foundation, supra note 7 at para 204.
40.  2009 ONCJ 572 at para 15.
41.  See R v Anderson, 2014 SCC 41 at para 44.
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as a matter of policy founded on the efficiency of the system
of criminal justice” which also recognizes that prosecutorial
discretion is “especially ill-suited to judicial review”.
The Court also [in Krieger] noted the more practical
problems associated with regular review of prosecutorial
discretion:
The quasi-judicial function of the Attorney General
cannot be subjected to interference from parties who
are not as competent to consider the various factors
involved in making a decision to prosecute. To subject
such decisions to political interference, or to judicial
supervision, could erode the integrity of our system of
prosecution.42
Preventing the work of the courts from becoming trivialized might therefore
be a worthwhile goal, but it is not one which can justify the existence of a de
minimis defence.
Justice Arbour’s final argument was that the defence “saves courts from
being swamped by an enormous number of trivial cases”.43 Once again the
concern, especially in our post-Jordan time, is not an inappropriate one, but
does not lead to the conclusion sought. In fact, this justification seems like a
bit of a red herring.
Are courts currently swamped by an enormous number of trivial cases?
Given how rarely de minimis is even argued, it does not seem that that can
be the case. And given that it is undecided whether there even is a defence
of de minimis, its use cannot be the explanation for the absence of that
swamping.44 If anything, the absence of such a swamping is a demonstration
that prosecutorial discretion provides sufficient protection. Crown prosecutors
are obliged to consider, beyond the question of whether there is a reasonable
prospect of conviction, factors such as the gravity of the incident, the degree of
culpability of the accused, that a conviction is likely to result in an insignificant
penalty or alternatively that the sentence would be unduly harsh to the accused,
42.  Ibid at paras 46–47 [citation omitted].
43.  Canadian Foundation, supra note 7 at para 204.
44.  Justice Arbour claims in Canadian Foundation that: “The judicial system is not plagued
by a multitude of insignificant prosecutions for conduct that merely meets the technical
requirements of ‘a crime’ (e.g., theft of a penny) because prosecutorial discretion is effective and
because the common law defence of de minimis non curat lex (the law does not care for small
or trifling matters) is available to judges.” See ibid at para 200. With respect, there is very little
evidence to support the second half of her claim.
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whether there are alternatives to prosecution, and even directly that the offence
is of a trivial or technical nature:45 it is difficult to think of a basis for deciding
that a case is too trifling that is not encompassed within those considerations.
The current absence of an enormous number of trivial cases in court is more
a demonstration of the lack of need for a de minimis defence than it is an
argument for the creation of one.
Further, creating an additional defence is not likely, in most cases, to reduce
the burden on courts: it is more likely to increase it. Creating a defence of de
minimis will not mean that cases do not end up in court in the first place: a
judge cannot realistically decide that a particular case was trivial until at least
the entire Crown’s case has been presented. It would then be possible formally
to treat a de minimis claim as some sort of directed verdict claim,46 but far more
likely is that the defence will be argued at the close of the accused’s case. In that
event no time will have been saved: the only effect will be that additional court
resources were used to argue the de minimis point along with everything else.
If there were a good policy rationale for having a de minimis-based
dispensing power, the fact that it would use additional resources would not be
a reason to refuse to have such a power. However, the claim that it will reduce
the use of resources is flimsy at best, and not a justification for the creation of
such a power.
In sum, then, the rationales which have been offered for creating a defence
of de minimis are not compelling. We now turn to the reasons against creating
such a defence.

III. The Case Against De Minimis
Broadly, once the criminal justice system has been invoked, it is up to judges
to adjudicate guilt or innocence. However, it is not up to judges to decide
whether the system should be invoked. There is no question that there must be
discretion about the use of the system, but that discretion does not belong to
judges. Judges quite properly have a lot of discretionary powers, but those are
all powers which exist after it has been decided that a prosecution should be
brought: they have no discretion with regard to that initial decision. There are
a number of other contexts in which that is the well-settled and (appropriately)
45.  See for example the factors listed in the Ontario Crown Prosecution Manual under the
heading “Charge Screening: Public Interest” or in the British Columbia Crown Counsel Policy
Manual under the heading “Charge Assessment Guidelines: Public Interest Factors that Weigh
Against Prosecution”. See Ministry of the Attorney General, Ontario Crown Prosecution Manual
(Prosecution Directive) (14 November 2017); British Columbia Prosecution Service, Crown
Counsel Policy Manual (Prosecution Directive) (1 March 2018).
46.  See e.g. R v Juneja, supra note 40 (Juneja perhaps being the example).
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unquestioned approach. To decline to have a dispensing power based on de
minimis is to adopt the same approach in that context as the settled orthodoxy
in other analogous situations.
Further, the interests a judge might be trying to serve by using a de minimis
defence can be equally or better served by other means which are already
available: in that event, the dispensing power is not only ill-advised but
unnecessary. Let us consider why that is so.
It is for good reason that we do not allow judges to decide whether the
criminal justice system should be invoked in the first place: such a role
would not sit well with a judge’s role as a neutral arbiter, nor with judicial
independence. The separation of powers arguments on this point are familiar
and well-established, but no less correct for being longstanding.47 If a judge
says of some cases “I do not approve of this prosecution being brought”, then
in appearance and in practical terms that amounts to approving of all the other
prosecutions being brought. That would be inappropriate, but de minimis
amounts to nothing more than saying “I do not approve of this prosecution
being brought”.
To some extent this argument has already been made in the previous
section, in pointing out that a judge quite properly does not have the ability
to override prosecutorial discretion to bring a prosecution simply because she
disagrees with the way that discretion was exercised. That rule exists for good
reason. Prosecutors have all of the facts before them and might be aware of
reasons—reasons which cannot properly be disclosed to the judge—that the
prosecution ought to be brought. Perhaps there is a raft of such offences in
the area. Perhaps the prosecution of this offender for stealing a single grape, or
throwing a single cigarette butt on the ground, has been deemed necessary for
reasons of general deterrence. Perhaps there are other proper motives, relating
to different prosecutions, of which the judge cannot be informed. If those
reasons are improper ones, then of course an abuse of process claim might be
a live possibility: if they are not improper then the decision is the correct, or at
least a justifiable, one.
Now, of course there are likely to occasionally be times when an individual
Crown prosecutor will make what the great majority of people, perhaps even
the great majority of people apprised of all the facts, would regard as the wrong
decision. Sometimes Crown prosecutors will make mistakes. But it does not
follow from that fact that the solution is to give a supervisory power to a person
who possesses less information. Judges are not immune to making mistakes
either, and we should not decide to create a defence on the fiction that it would
be applied perfectly. Yes, a Crown can lose objectivity, but a judge can fail to
understand the objective circumstances through lack of knowledge. We could
47.  For a discussion of the separation of powers arguments, see R v Anderson, supra note 41; R
v Felderhof (2003), 68 OR (3d) 481, 235 DLR (4th) 131 (CA).
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create a system which did not trust the Crown with a discretionary role—but
that is not the system we have created. We either place our faith in the good
sense of Crown prosecutors or we do not: we should not do so everywhere
except when it comes to a possible de minimis claim.
There are other contexts in which the system takes this same approach. If
a conviction has been overturned, for example, subsection 686(2) of the Code
sets out the powers of a court of appeal: to acquit or to direct a new trial.48 In
choosing between an acquittal or a new trial, the case law has set out criteria
by which to make that decision, but in general it is a question of whether
it is possible that the accused could be convicted at a new trial.49 We are all
familiar with cases where a court of appeal will conclude that it does not have
the authority to order an acquittal, but in ordering a new trial uses language
which seems like a hint to the Crown that it recommends against proceeding
again.50 When no conviction is possible, a court of appeal can acquit, but when
conviction is possible but prosecution seems unwise or unnecessary, the most a
court of appeal can do is suggest to the Crown how it might choose to exercise
its own discretion.
The first point to note is that this is another example of a circumstance where
the actual decision whether to use the system or not rests with the Crown, not a
court. The second point to note, though, is that just as a court of appeal has the
ability to make suggestions to the Crown, so too does a trial judge. A trial court
has an implied power to control its own process, which goes beyond protecting
against abuse of process. T
h e use of this power raises the risk of a judge seeming
to “enter the arena” and must be exercised with caution, but it certainly exists.51
Could a judge, faced with a prosecution where it seems as though a de minimis
defence, if it existed, might be relevant, raise that question with the Crown,
either in a conference or in open court?
Would it be improper for a trial judge to ask a prosecutor a question such
as “this incident seems very minor: have you fully thought through whether to
bring this prosecution?” If that question by itself seems improper, then of course
a de minimis defence where the judge not merely asks but answers that question
on behalf of the Crown is even more improper. If the question is not improper,

48.  See Criminal Code, supra note 30, s 686(2). Case law has concluded that a court of appeal
can also order a stay of proceedings, but only to prevent an abuse of process. See R v Dhillon,
2014 BCCA 480 at para 38.
49.  See e.g. R v Maciel, 2007 ONCA 196. Though in that case, the particular issue was the
impact of fresh evidence. Unsurprisingly, Maciel is another decision which relied on Don’s
work, though not on that particular point.
50.  See Reference re Milgaard, [1992] 1 SCR 875, 1992 CarswellSask 459; R v Sheppard, 2002
SCC 26.
51.  See R v Felderhof, supra note 47 at para 45.

279

(2019) 44:2 Queen’s LJ

then it is an alternative to a de minimis defence which respects the appropriate
and differing roles played by judges and Crown prosecutors.
For that matter, another alternative available to a judge who feels that a
prosecution should not have been brought exists at the sentencing stage: an
absolute discharge. A trial judge who concludes that the accused was technically
guilty of the offence but that the incident was so minor that the prosecution
ought not to have been brought can rely on section 730 of the Criminal Code to
discharge the accused absolutely, the effect of which is that the person “shall be
deemed not to have been convicted of the offence”.52 Functionally this serves all
the goals that a de minimis defence would serve. Legally, it has the same effect
that the accused was not convicted. Practically, the accused will have had to go
through the trial first to receive a discharge, but that is equally the case in order
to successfully raise a defence. Conceptually, granting an absolute discharge
serves the goal of preserving respect for the administration of justice (at least
insofar as the behaviour of courts is concerned, which is all a judicial dispensing
power could do) by showing that the system as a whole is able to properly
acknowledge the triviality of some breaches.
And of course, we can think about those two possibilities being combined:
at a conference a judge could say “this seems so trivial that I expect I would
grant an absolute discharge: are you sure you want to bring the prosecution?”
Once again, if it seems acceptable for a trial judge to say that, then it serves the
purpose of a de minimis defence but is more consistent with the differing roles
of judges and prosecutors. If it does not seem acceptable for a trial judge to say
that, then a de minimis defence itself should seem even more unacceptable.
So, in other contexts, judges for good reasons do not have the power to
decide whether the system should be used, but do have options which give
them input into the important results. To not have a de minimis defence is
therefore to remain consistent with the approach used in all other contexts.
One final analogy should be drawn, between the de minimis defence and
constitutional exemptions. Briefly, my argument here that a de minimis defence
should not exist is that: (1) constitutional exemptions and a de minimis based
dispensing power are functionally identical; (2) if anything, the argument for
constitutional exemptions is stronger than that for de minimis; and (3) the
Supreme Court of Canada has correctly rejected the possibility of constitutional
exemptions as a Charter remedy.
First, let us consider why constitutional exemptions and a de minimis based
dispensing power are functionally identical. A de minimis defence, of course,
would allow a judge to say “the statute has been violated and I will leave that
statutory prohibition in place, but I will not apply it on this occasion”. The
notion behind a constitutional exemption was exactly the same: as it was put
in R v Ferguson, “that the law remain in force, but that it not be applied in
52.  Supra note 30, s 730(3).
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cases where its application results in a Charter violation”.53 Both defences would
purport to create a dispensing power, allowing an individual judge’s view, based
on that judge’s personal sense of the moral blameworthiness of the particular
accused’s behaviour, to override the statutory provision saying that behaviour of
that sort should be the subject of criminal punishment.54
It is worth noting, in order to avoid confusion, an ambiguity in the use of
the term “constitutional exemption”. There is also a specialized meaning of the
term used when a law has been struck down in its entirety under section 52 of
the Constitution Act, 1982, but the declaration of invalidity has been suspended
for some period of time.55 In such cases, the individual claimant is sometimes
allowed to benefit from the declaration of invalidity despite the general
suspension, and some cases refer to that as a “constitutional exemption”.56 That
is in effect the exact opposite of the normal use of the term. Normally the
point is that an accused is not bound by a statute which remains valid: in the
specialized use the accused is not bound by a statute which has been found to
be invalid. The thing requiring justification in the specialized case is that anyone
is bound by it, not the exception to that.
Second, the case for constitutional exemptions was stronger than for de
minimis. As explained above, a dispensing power based simply on a trial judge’s
disagreement with a Crown prosecutor as to whether a particular violation
was or was not worth prosecuting is inconsistent with our approach in many
other aspects of the criminal justice system, and would dramatically expand
the sphere in which a judge can operate. In contrast, the question of whether
a constitutional exemption should be given would only arise after a judge had
determined that there was a Charter violation. It would only be in a context
where it was unambiguous that that judge could give some remedy that the
question of whether that particular remedy was available. Further, there
was even an argument for constitutional exemptions on the wording of the
Constitution: section 52 provides that a law is of no force and effect “to the
extent of the inconsistency”.57 It was at least arguable that, in some cases, the
extent of the inconsistency was only “the exact facts of this case”.
53.  2008 SCC 6 at para 37.
54.  In Ferguson, the particular issue was whether to make an exemption to the minimum
punishment rather than to the prohibition itself, but that does not change the fundamental
point that the judge’s own moral sense of blameworthiness would be allowed to replace
Parliament’s assessment of blameworthiness. See ibid.
55.  s 52, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
56.  For an example of such a case, see Carter v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5
[Carter]. “In the result, the trial judge declared the prohibition unconstitutional, granted a oneyear suspension of invalidity, and provided Ms. Taylor with a constitutional exemption for use
during the one-year period of the suspension” (ibid at para 32).
57.  Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 55, s 52.
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Nonetheless, the Court decided in Ferguson that constitutional exemptions
simply do not exist as a remedy, and in Carter v Canada (Attorney General)
declined an explicit invitation from the British Columbia Court of Appeal to
change their mind about that point.58 The reasons in Ferguson for rejecting
constitutional exemptions apply equally well or better to a de minimis based
dispensing power.
The Court notes, for example, that constitutional exemptions are an
intrusion into the legislative sphere: that “the effect of granting a constitutional
exemption would be to so change the legislation as to create something different
in nature from what Parliament intended”.59 That is true of a de minimis
defence as well: Parliament will have said that a provision applies to a particular
type of behaviour but the judge will be saying that it does not. As noted
above, if the judge were simply using de minimis as an interpretive principle
to understand how an offence should always be interpreted, that would be the
proper role of a judge: to use it as a dispensing power, however, is to intrude on
the role of Parliament. Further, it is to do so with even less justification than
a constitutional exemption might have had, since the basis for it will not be a
Charter violation but only the judge’s personal sense of discomfort.
Further—and finally, for our purposes—the Court rejected constitutional
exemptions on the basis that they “buy flexibility at the cost of undermining
the rule of law.”60 It held:
The mere possibility of such a remedy thus necessarily
generates uncertainty: the law is on the books, but in practice,
it may not apply. As constitutional exemptions are actually
granted, the law in the statute books will in fact increasingly
diverge from the law as applied.61
That concern applies equally to a de minimis based dispensing power.
Indeed, one could simply replace the words “constitutional exemptions” in that
quote with “de minimis defences” and it would capture a legitimate objection
to them.
The Court also held in Ferguson that
[t]he divergence between the law on the books and the law
as applied — and the uncertainty and unpredictability that
result — exacts a price paid in the coin of injustice. First, it
impairs the right of citizens to know what the law is in advance
58.  See R v Ferguson, supra note 53 at para 74; Carter, supra note 56 at paras 37, 124–25.
59.  R v Ferguson, supra note 53 at para 50.
60.  Ibid at para 67.
61.  Ibid at para 70.
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and govern their conduct accordingly — a fundamental tenet
of the rule of law. Second, it risks over-application of the
law; as Le Dain J. noted in Smith, the assumed validity of
the law may prejudice convicted persons when judges must
decide whether to apply it in particular cases. Third, it invites
duplication of effort. The matter of constitutionality would
not be resolved once and for all as under s. 52(1); in every case
where a violation is suspected, the accused would be obliged
to seek a constitutional exemption. In so doing, it creates an
unnecessary barrier to the effective exercise of the convicted
offender’s constitutional rights, thereby encouraging uneven
and unequal application of the law.62
Each of these concerns translates over to a de minimis dispensing power
as well. If in fact particular behaviour would not be found by a judge to be
unlawful, despite the fact that the Criminal Code says that it is, then citizens
cannot know what the law is in advance. If police and prosecutors rely on what
the Code says—as they must, since they do not have access to the eventual
trial judge’s personal sense of fairness—then there is a risk that the law will
be overapplied. And if that view of the individual trial judge were allowed to
take priority over the expression of the will of Parliament, then of course there
is inevitable duplication of effort: we will have moved away from having the
law dictated by statute, and will have taken a retrograde step toward it being
whatever the individual trial judge in the individual case thinks it should be.

Conclusion
In sum, a defence of de minimis would sit so uneasily with foundational
approaches to Canadian criminal law that it should not be created. Yes, the
fact that a transgression is so minor that it does not merit criminal liability
is relevant, but that notion is properly taken into account as an interpretive
aid, not as a dispensing power. Yes, someone needs to have the ability to say
“technically this violates the statute but a prosecution would be inappropriate”,
but that person ought not to be a judge. The interests that are intended to be
served by having a de minimis dispensing power can all be served equally well by
other means, and those other means are not inconsistent with the proper role of
judges or with the rule of law. De minimis should not be a defence.

62.  Ibid at para 72.

283

(2019) 44:2 Queen’s LJ

